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GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO 
THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE 
OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO 
BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE 
EFFECTS 
 
Discussion Paper 
 
Information Requirements for Explosive Remnants of War, 
the Views of the Clearance Community 
 
Prepared by the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). 
 
Introduction 
Access to relevant information is vital to the establishment and operational 
effectiveness of any clearance and risk education programme designed to alleviate the 
effects of explosive remnants of war (ERW). Where that information is available, it 
can have a direct and almost immediate impact on operations, and helps to ensure that 
the threat from ERW is dealt with efficiently, mitigating the risk for civilians. 
However, the type and level of information needed will vary depending on the parties 
to the conflict, nature of the conflict, and the location of ERW. Information, such as 
the nature of the munitions used and their aim points, is extremely useful to the 
organisations involved in post-conflict clearance and risk education operations. This 
information assists in establishing the size of the operation, identification of the assets 
required for the problem, training requirements, resource mobilisation, and 
prioritisation of tasks. 
 
The information required to assist clearance and risk education operations is generally 
available to most parties to a conflict. The issue is ensuring that accurate information 
is released in a timely manner and in a useable format. Failure to release the 
information by the military means that humanitarian organisations have no alternative 
but to try to find the answers themselves, as the information is essential to the safety 
and effectiveness of their work. This inevitably has significant resource implications, 
not just in terms of cost for field surveys, or in the substantial amount of time 
involved, but potentially also in human lives and limbs that could otherwise have been 
saved. Where survey work is required because of the lack of information, the risks are 
raised that an accident will occur within the civilian community;  not knowing or not 
being informed that a munition has been used can lead to important messages not 
being passed to the local communities leaving them in greater risk.  
 
Supported by the Coordinator for ERW, the GICHD undertook a study on the 
Information Requirements for ERW.1 The aim of that report was to inform States 
Parties of what those currently engaged in clearance and risk education operations 
believe are their information requirements. This discussion paper summarises the 
main findings of that report.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Explosive Remnants of War – Information Requirements, published by GICHD, May 2003. 
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Which information 
There are a number of areas in which information could be usefully provided. The 
GICHD examined three: technical information, geographic information and markings 
information. 
 
Technical Information 
This relates to details about the physical characteristics of munitions: type, fuse 
method of operation, explosive content, hazards, presence of anti-handling devices. 
 
If there is one element of every munition which the clearance community would like 
to know about,  it is the means of initiation of the munition, whether by a fuze, anti-
handling device or self-destruction mechanism. Of these, the single most important 
piece of information are any details on anti-handling or anti-disturbance devices 
which munitions may have. Even to know of the existence of these devices on a 
munition will save lives as it prevents the use of inappropriate clearance procedures. 
Only marginally less important are the method of operation for a fuze (is it contact, 
proximity, or timed fuze) and details of any self-destruction mechanism. As one 
respondent to our research noted: 
 
“Knowledge of fuzing systems can be very important to the explosive 
ordnance operator as the fuze is the critical component which determines 
whether the unexploded ordnance functions or not and some fuzes can prove 
to be more sensitive than others. Likewise knowledge of anti-handling, anti-
disturbance and self destruction incorporated in the fuzing can prove in certain 
instances to be ‘safety critical’ especially where charge placement  is 
concerned and when planning to clear an area with munitions which may 
explode unexpectedly as their self-destruct times elapse.”2 
 
There has been considerable debate within the Group of Government Experts on 
ERW about the provision of what are termed “Render Safe Procedures”. For the 
military there is an understandable reluctance to provide technical procedures which 
allow for fuze diagnostics and removal,  and therefore potential exploitation of 
munitions. However, the clearance community prefers to dispose of munitions via 
conventional munitions destruction, which involves the destruction of all or part of 
the munition, usually using an explosive charge, to inert or destroy the munition. Our 
research show that it is not critical for the clearance community to know the full range 
of technical options for render safe procedures. This is not to say they are not useful, 
for example should a large bomb need to be cleared from the middle of a village, or 
next to a hospital, then destruction may not be possible. But the views of the clearance 
community show a practical understanding of the issues and it is for States Parties to 
decide what they can do to ensure flexibility for the disposal techniques of ERW. 
 
Many munition types are standard throughout the world like grenades and mortars. 
While the established hazards of high explosive and conventional munitions are well 
known, there is a concern to know about new and unusual hazards which may require 
the acquisition and use of non-standard equipment, or the development of new 
operating procedures. The clearance community would like to know about the hazards 
                                                          
2 Supplementary comments made by Afghan Technical Consultants in their GICHD questionnaire, 
April 2003. 
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posed by munitions, such as unusual chemical compositions, fuel-air explosives, high 
toxicity and recommended danger areas. 
 
The above details are munitions specific, on the broader question of what has been 
used and how many munitions have been used, the clear preference of the clearance 
community is to know what has been used. For parties to a conflict this should be a 
relatively simple task to provide a list of munitions employed. Respondents to the 
research of the GICHD viewed the quantities of munitions used, broken down by 
munition types as only useful, and this was a strong preference. 
 
Geographic Information. 
This relates to the location of possible ERW, in this instance the  aim points for 
munitions, such as submunitions and artillery rounds. 
 
Geographic information has already been provided to clearance organisations in post-
conflict environments, as has happened in Kosovo and Afghanistan and is starting to 
happen in Iraq. So it is with the benefit of experience that the single most important 
factor in the provision of geographic information is that of accuracy. Inaccurate 
information wastes valuable and scarce resources. Accurate information saves time, 
resources and lives. 
 
Information on Munitions Markings. 
This is used in the survey, risk education and clearance components of the 
programme. Such data helps to correctly identify the threat, enable the right 
techniques to be employed, and produce and disseminate accurate educational tools to 
help affect communities. 
 
The impact of information on the markings and visual characteristics of munitions is 
dependent to some extent on which munitions are used, as already mentioned 
clearance organisations want to know what has been used. Markings are seen as 
particularly important for compiling a risk education programmes. While it can be 
important to know munition markings with unusual and toxic or hazardous contents, 
for standard munitions this is relatively little variance between nations. 
 
How and When information should be provided. 
With regard to the timings by which information is received, the consensus is clearly 
“as soon as possible”, with technical and marking information to be provided in 
advance and geographic information immediately after the end of the conflict.3 
Several respondents annotated their papers or made supplementary comments that 
while information must be available quickly they also emphasised the need for 
accuracy. Information which is not accurate discredits the information source and 
wastes valuable resources which are deployed to confirm the information only to find 
no evidence.  The programme manager in Kosovo in 1999 comments that “the 
credibility of the information was affected by glaring inaccuracies, such as survey 
teams unable to locate any sign of cluster bomb strikes in many areas where they were 
                                                          
3 For geographic information, the option of receiving information before the end of the conflict was not 
offered. This decision was made to reflect the realities of the situation, that military forces are generally 
reluctant to state where they are targeting their munitions while the conflict continues.  
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reported, as well as strikes located many kilometres from any area supposedly 
affected.” 4 
 
The form in which information is received depends to some extent on the location and 
organisational set-up of the clearance programme. While some form of computer-
based information management system is the norm, the formats vary5. Further, 
information is required for work in the field, often some distance from the 
headquarters, where laptop computers may not be practical. Therefore the top two 
choices were for choices which involved either hard or soft copy or a multiple format 
involving both. Therefore there is a strong preference to receive information in both 
hard and soft copy. Should States Parties undertake to provide information, it is 
critical  that standard formats are agreed and used. 
 
As to how the information was passed, the preference was through UNMAS, a mine 
action centre (MAC) and then via a military liaison officer (MLO). In reality, all three 
choices function simultaneously usually in the immediate post-conflict phase. It 
should be noted that other UN organisations including UNDP, UNICEF and UNOPS 
are also involved in the provision of mine action programmes. However, UNMAS is 
the UN focal point for clearance activities, and is responsible for coordinating this 
work when linked to peacekeeping and emergency situations. While preferences were 
stated, it is perhaps most important that organisations know who will have this 
information and how they can get hold of it. The optimum solution would probably 
involve a mix of UN, MAC and MLOs, providing an information point for all  
organisations. 
 
Feasibility and Impact Statement 
Of the information requirements covered in this report, all are readily available to 
military forces today. If the information is not provided, humanitarian organisations 
still have to discover the information through the employment of survey techniques in 
the danger areas. It is not a question of whether this information is available or not, 
this knowledge is fundamental to the operational safety and efficiency of a clearance 
programme. Should States Parties provide accurate information, when needed, in a 
useable form it will have a direct, almost immediate impact on the clearance 
programme and help alleviate the humanitarian impact of the civilian population at 
risk. 
 
                                                          
4 John Flanagan, Mitigating the Effects of Cluster Bomb Sub-Munitions, Paper prepared for Pax Christi 
Ireland conference on explosive remnants of war, April 2003. 
5 In the majority (85%) of national mine action programmes, the GICHD Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is used. The remaining national programmes and some non-
governmental organisations use a mixture of different systems. 
